Hallen and Sodipo's finding that the Yoruba distinction between knowing and believing is drawn in a different place from the English one, why that is a genuine philosophical result, and what it exposes about Western epistemology.
The Yorùbá wey dem quote, the proverbs, oríkì, ẹsẹ Ifá, word list headwords, Odù names and citations dey exactly as the corpus record dem, for every language.
Yoruba get two words where English get "know" and "believe", and dem no divide things di same way. Ìmọ̀ dey cover wetin person don verify by demself firsthand. Ìgbàgbọ́ dey cover wetin person accept based on wetin anoda person talk. Di dividing line dey between firsthand and secondhand, no be between certainty and uncertainty, and na why e cut across how English take divide am instead of to match am. Na dat one be di main finding for Barry Hallen and J. Olubi Sodipo book Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft, and na one of di few results for African philosophy wey really make people rethink Western philosophical assumption, instead of to just add comparative example on top .
Dis file dey argue say di finding serious for philosophy well well and no be just ethnographic curiosity, and e still bring out di objections, because dem dey weighty.
Hallen and Sodipo na philosophers, one American and one Nigerian, and Sodipo na professional Yoruba-speaking philosopher wey belong to analytic tradition. Wetin dem do na to hold long structured discussions with onísègùn, di masters of Yoruba medicine, about di meaning and how dem dey use some particular terms: ìmọ̀, ìgbàgbọ́, òótọ́ and di vocabulary of àjẹ́ .
Three things about di method deserve make person pay attention to dem.
First, dem go meet practitioners instead of to read texts, and dem meet category of practitioners wey dia profession dey force dem to make and defend claims to knowledge under conditions where mistake get serious consequence. Onísègùn wey mistake identify plant or misdiagnose case go fail for everybody eye.
Second, dem treat wetin di people talk as philosophical data, dey analyze and argue am like how ordinary language philosophy dey do, instead of to just report am as beliefs wey one group of people hold. Dem don describe di book as di only analysis of indigenous discourse about African belief system wey dem do from inside di framework of Anglo-American analytical philosophy .
Third, and di one wey important pass, di whole project start from W. V. O. Quine thesis on indeterminacy of translation . Quine argument na say translation between languages no dey fully determined by all di behavioural evidence wey dey, so translation manuals wey disagree fit still match everything wey speakers dey do and talk equally. How Hallen and Sodipo apply am dey very clear: if dat one na true, den di normal bilingual dictionary way wey dey equate ìmọ̀ with knowledge and ìgbàgbọ́ with belief no be neutral findings but na choices, and one hundred years of scholarship wey dey describe wetin "the Yoruba believe" stand on top translation wey nobody examine well. Quine write foreword for di Stanford edition .
Na dat framing make di book be philosophy instead of ethnography. E no dey report exotic opinions. Wetin e dey argue na say one particular translation dey wrong and say dat mistake get consequences for wetin anybody fit claim say dem know about African thought.
Ìmọ̀ na wetin di onísègùn dey take as proper knowledge, and di standard na firsthand experience: wetin person see with dia own eye and experience directly, provided say conscious understanding dey for wetin dem perceive . Na only propositions wey describe dat kind experience dem dey count as òótọ́, true .
Two clarifications dey prevent make person no misunderstand dis one as naive empiricism.
Di comprehension condition dey do serious work here. To just get sense impression no be ìmọ̀. Di onísègùn demand say di person wey perceive must understand wetin dem perceive, and dis one put interpretive part inside di criterion, which mean say di same event fit produce ìmọ̀ for trained observer and e no go produce am for untrained person. Onísègùn wey dey look patient dey see things wey ordinary person wey stand by no dey see.
And ojú, eye, no stop only for physical eye. How Oluwatoyin Vincent Adepoju explain di wider Yoruba epistemological vocabulary show di progression from ojú òde, di outside eye, to ojú inú, di inside eye, where di inside eye dey cover critical thinking, imagination, intuition, and forms of perception wey pass normal senses . Babatunde Lawal work on Yoruba perception theory na di foundation here . So Yoruba first-person witness broad pass sensory observation, and divinatory or trained perception fit count as firsthand. Wetin e dey exclude no be wetin pass di senses. Wetin e dey exclude na hearsay.
Ìgbàgbọ́ na wetin person get from anoda person. Di morphology dey clear and na di key to di whole analysis: gbà, to accept or receive, and gbọ́, to hear. Ìgbàgbọ́ na to accept wetin you hear.
Dis one no be di etymology of English "belief", wey come from Germanic roots wey connect to wetin person hold dear and no mention source at all. English belief na propositional attitude wey dey defined by how strong e be and how e relate to truth. Yoruba ìgbàgbọ́ dey defined by where di information come from. Di two words dey classify things with different criteria entirely, and once person see dat one, e go clear say di standard dictionary equation no mean say dem be di same thing.
Hallen later etymological analysis push am go further, dey argue say e better to translate ìgbàgbọ́ as affirmation instead of belief, as e dey show stronger and more conscious mental state pass wetin English belief dey show . Ìgbàgbọ́ no be something wey dey shaky. Person fit get full confidence for dia ìgbàgbọ́ and e go still remain ìgbàgbọ́, because how dem classify am depend on where e come from, no be on top how confident you dey.
Make we notice the modern way dem dey use the word wey fit confuse Yoruba Christian reader: ìgbàgbọ́ na the standard Yoruba word for religious faith, and onígbàgbọ́, person wey get ìgbàgbọ́, na the normal Yoruba word for Christian. For inside Christian usage, the term dey name good character or virtue. For the way onísègùn dey use am, e dey name the category of knowledge wey never meet the standard. The same word dey carry the highest religious praise for one side, and for the other side e dey mark lower level of knowledge; dis one no really be contradiction, na just two communities wey dey use one word for wetin each of dem feel say na the main thing.
The relationship between the two categories no be say one dey look down on the other. Na from Ìgbàgbọ́ almost everything dey start, and the main question wey dey interesting na wetin dey happen to am.
Person fit test and verify second-hand information through experiment, and if the verification succeed, e go turn to ìmọ̀ . Na dis one be the main point. Ìgbàgbọ́ no be say e go remain second-class forever; na temporary thing, and way dey to comot from am, and that way na make you go check am.
Where person no fit do verification, discussion, analysis, and good judgement na the tools wey dem dey take separate information wey dey more reliable from the one wey no too reliable . So the framework no be just crude thinking say any claim wey dem never verify no get value. Na framework wey get three levels: the one wey person establish directly by firsthand experience, the one wey dem accept from other people and judge with good sense, and the one wey dem reject.
Look wetin dis one mean for practical work of onísègùn. Im training na mostly wetin teacher pass down to am, wey dey come as ìgbàgbọ́. Im go come use the medicine, observe wetin happen, and convert wetin e fit convert into ìmọ̀. Im mature competence na body of tested knowledge wey start as testimony, and the epistemology dey describe im professional life well: practitioner wey just accept wetin im teacher talk without testing am at all go be, by im own community standard, person wey get plenty ìgbàgbọ́ and small ìmọ̀.
Person fit easily think say na just interesting language difference. E pass that one, because of four reasons.
E dey separate where information come from from how sure the thing be, something wey Western epistemology dey find hard to do. The standard Anglo-American analysis, wey be say knowledge na justified true belief, dey make belief the main group and knowledge one type under am, so to know something mean say you must believe am. For the Yoruba system, ìmọ̀ no be type under ìgbàgbọ́, because na where the information come from dey separate dem, and one thing no fit be firsthand and secondhand at the same time. Ìmọ̀ no mean say ìgbàgbọ́ must follow. That one na different structure of epistemology entirely, no be just different grammar.
E dey put epistemology of testimony for center instead of side. Anglo-American epistemology treat testimony like small matter for almost all the twentieth century, and na only from the 1990s e come turn major subfield. Yoruba epistemology, as Hallen and Sodipo describe am, arrange everything around the question of testimony from the start, because e dey use language structure to separate wetin you find out yourself from wetin dem tell you. For oral culture, where dem dey pass all intellectual heritage down through testimony, to get first-class category wey dey mark testimonial source no be limitation. Na the proper design.
E dey show one assumption wey dey inside the Western view. The Anglo-American way dey allow statement wey person get purely from testimony to count as knowledge if the testimony reliable and other conditions complete, so dem no dey mark the difference between to find out yourself and to hear from person for the concept level. Yoruba dey mark am. None of dem clearly right pass the other, and the interesting result na say the choice na real choice. Na Quine point be dat wey show as solid finding: wetin look like the natural way to divide epistemic states turn out to be just one option among others.
E dey show say reflective epistemology dey inside oral culture wey no get written philosophy. No be as ordinary proverbs or folk sayings, but as clear criteria wey the onísègùn dey state, apply, and defend when dem question dem. Hallen related work on values find the same thing for moral domain: as dem dey evaluate action and character, dem dey follow clear and logical criteria, against the common assumption say African thought na just to accept old values without question .
The words wey dem dey use for truth deserve separate discussion because na here the confidence of this corpus dey drop.
Dem report say Òótọ́ na wetin onísègùn dey use for statements wey describe firsthand experience, and na the term wey relate to ìmọ̀ the same way truth dey relate to knowledge . Òtítọ́ na the other Yoruba term wey dem usually translate as truth, wey dey connect with truthfulness, honesty, and the moral character of the person wey dey talk.
Whether dis ones na two different concepts or na two forms of one word, and whether Yoruba dey draw the line between propositional truth and personal truthfulness the way that explanation suggest, this corpus never fit establish from any source wey e check. Dem state the relationship between the two terms with confidence for several places inside secondary literature without any analysis to back am up. Confidence: low. Readers wey need dis matter suppose go read Hallen and Sodipo directly instead of to rely on summaries, including dis particular one.
Wetin person fit talk na say, as dem tie òótọ́ to ìmọ̀, e mean say the Yoruba truth predicate as onísègùn dey use am get strict condition pass the English one. Statement fit dey, as we go talk, true, without any speaker dey in a position to call am òótọ́, because nobody never establish am at first hand.
People don contest this finding, and the objections make sense. To present am without dem go misrepresent the state of the field.
Infallibilism. Di biggest allegation na say, to take eye-mark verification as di highest standard, come join am with strong division between knowledge and belief, don push Hallen and Sodipo go position where dem dey claim say ìmọ̀ no fit make mistake at all. If ìmọ̀ need firsthand experience wey no fit ever wrong, dat standard na wetin almost nothing fit meet, since wetin person see with im own eye fit deceive person sometimes. Onísègùn self dey see things wrong sometimes. Di objection na say dis explanation don produce epistemology wey tight pass wetin person fit practice for real life, including di practice of di onísègùn demsef.
Testimony. Di related objection na say how dem see testimony tight pass as e suppose be, and say oral culture fit depend, and actually dey depend, on wetin people talk as genuine source of justification without meaning say dem just dey swallow everything or dem no dey question tradition . If Yoruba epistemology true-true bring down everything wey person receive from oda people, oral culture no go fit keep body of knowledge pass from generation to generation, but clear-clear na so e dey happen. Di critics dey argue say make dem understand testimony as source of justification for Yoruba practice, with di difference between ìmọ̀ and ìgbàgbọ́ showing sometin wey no tight reach how Hallen and Sodipo present am.
Representativeness. Di onísègùn na special class for one particular area for Yorubaland, wey dem interview for 1970s and 1980s. Whether di way dem dey use language na di normal Yoruba way generally, or na professional language of group wey dem work require extra carefulness for knowledge matter, na correct question to ask. If person do similar study of English language among laboratory scientists, e go also produce stricter meaning of "know" pass wetin general English dey support.
Determinacy again. Quine thesis na two-edged sword for here. If translation true-true no fit dey fully fixed, dat one affect wetin Hallen and Sodipo choose as translation just as e affect di dictionary own. Di positive argument wey dem give, say ìmọ̀ dey follow firsthand experience, na translation manual on its own and e carry di same problem of underdetermination. Di negative argument of di book, say person no fit just assume say di standard translation match directly, strong pass di positive argument.
None of these objections show say di main observation na lie. Di morphology of ìgbàgbọ́ still be wetin e be, and di onísègùn talk wetin dem talk. Wetin di objections just do na to narrow di conclusion: Yoruba terms dey show where information come from for way wey English terms no dey do, and how much epistemic weight di tradition actually put on dat difference for practice no clear reach how di book take present am.
Three things, wey dem talk plainly.
Where information come from na permanent property of di information, wey deserve make dem mark am inside di concept. English dey let where info come from drop once dem don establish justification. Yoruba dey keep am. For culture wey knowledge dey pass through mouth, to trace di chain matter pass, and di vocabulary show dat one. Dis no be primitive feature. Na classification wey carry more information, and modern concerns about where claim come from inside world wey information dey circulate everywhere make am look less strange pass how e be for 1986.
To know something na achievement wey get history, no be just state. Ìmọ̀ na wetin you don do, say you go look am, test am, understand am. Di Anglo-American idea fit balance passively, just by person dey properly connected to fact. Di Yoruba idea as dem report am dey active all through, and e match tradition where knowledge no fit separate from competence: di onísègùn knowledge na wetin e fit do, and di babaláwo own na wetin dem don train am to perform.
Epistemology and ethics no be separate departments. Hallen find out say di same people dey treat moral and aesthetic evaluation as one subject, and di criteria for good character dey clear to state and defend di same way like criteria for knowledge . Adepoju own ojú inú, di inward eye, also put perception, critical thought, intuition, and moral discernment together on top single scale . Where Western tradition after Hume don work hard to separate facts from values, Yoruba vocabulary no make dat kind division, and di tradition dey treat good judgement as one capacity wey person dey use across different areas.
For reader wey dem tell say dis heritage no get intellectual content, di summary short. Community of practitioners wey no dey write, wey dey work for oral tradition, separate knowledge from belief with criteria wey dem fit explain, apply dem consistently, defend dem under questioning from two professional philosophers, and produce system wey Quine feel say make sense reach to write foreword about. Whether dem get epistemology correct na ongoing question. But say dem dey do am, dat one no be question at all.
The four-day week and the ritual calendar, how a Yoruba diagnosis of a problem actually proceeds, and an accurate account of aje, women's spiritual authority and the Gelede response.
How Yoruba philosophical concepts map and fail to map onto Greek, Christian, Islamic and modern Western categories, and what goes wrong when the translation is made anyway.
Ara, emi, ori, okan and ojiji, the disagreement among scholars about how many elements there are, why "soul" fits none of them, and what Yoruba rebirth and ancestorhood actually claim.
How truth is determined in Yoruba thought and practice, the etymology and relationship of otito and ooto, Hallen and Sodipo's imo/igbagbo distinction, and the standards of evidence the tradition applies to testimony and oath.
How divination functions as a diagnostic instrument and what kind of reasoning it supports, and Hallen and Sodipo's finding that Yoruba herbalists distinguish knowledge from belief by a criterion stricter than the English one.
Character as the whole content of Yoruba ethics, iwa pele and iwa rere, the identity of character with beauty, patience as the source of character, and an ethical system grounded in consequence and community rather than divine command.